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28y the same fiscal policy we mean the same budget deficit as a percentage
of output.
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4This is an empirically relevant specification: its essential property for
this paper is that seigniorage revenue first increases and then decreases
with correctly anticipated inflation.
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(4)H/HP/P —Y/y — — n
5Weiplictly assi.une (2) that the deficit s invariant to the inlatiori
rate, thereby omitting the well—known Clivera—Tanzi effect whereby higher





the expected rate of inflation and F' is the price level.





(3) d =H/H .H/P 6h
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The maximum steady state seigriorage revenue
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dual equilibria are a reflection of the Laffer curvesthe same amount D4
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Theadaptive expectations assumption makes most sense in conditi
which there are no reliable data. or the government budget defici
money growth1 which is not unusual in countries with high in4iat
rates and poorly developed statistical systems. Alternatively,
individuals may form expectations adaptively when the governments
policy and data announcements command very little credibility.
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chircet end Sargent lE7) use a i eastsquares learning mechari mm to 4cr
expectationsof next perods price level in a model with a money demand
function similar to that of Cagan,(SeeDeCanio lcT9)for a particularly
clear example of the use of least squares learning). They show that the low
inflationequilibrium is stable for a range of initial expected inflation
rates; for higher initial expected inflation rates there is no equilibrium
with learning, even in conditions where the higher rational expectations
equilibrium is stable, The results may be interpeted in light of the
property that the least squares predictor of the inflation rate is always
less than the maximum inflation rate observed so far. The generality of
their results is not clear ,fortheir money demand function unlike Cagan 's
permits real balances and seigniorage revenue to go negative, properties on
which their proofs depend.
'°We have benefitted from reading a Comment on this and related points by
Mario Henrique Simonsen.ic'
inflationrates (which are equal, where they are defined) both
moves with lower inflation to
uction in inflation takes place
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Returning to the adaptive expectations case, we exanit
effects of changes in several empirically relevant variables.
purposes of the discussion, we assume the economy is initially
low inflation equilibrium.
A fall in the exogenous growth rate1 n, for instance due to a
productivity slowdown, shows in the figure as a leftward shift of the
45Q line. This ha; the same qualitative effect as a rise in d.A fall
in the growth rate of output implies that the government has to
accelerate the printing of money if it desires to continue extracting





12Here again the Israeli case of the introduction of dollar linked liquid
bank deposits (Patam) after 1977 may serve as a good example, Another, but
probably less relevant, historical case is Hungary after World War II
(Bomberger and tlakinen, 1983).
'3This can be obtained from an ordinary short—run supply function
YY(W/P,K) ,translatedinto rates of change, and writing the change in the
nominal wage as a function of expected inflation. The supply function can










One interesting aspect of this relationship is that a 17. change
greater than 17.increase in the
Accordingly seeminglysmallchanges in the growth rate of output may be
associated with jar in the inflation rate.
A second ty urbance is a downward shift in the demand
function for base m example as a result of the introduction of
new financial asset close money substitute.12 From equation
(3) we see that 8 = thus a fall in h (for given ,r) has the
sam effect as a ri hiftirig the GB curve rightward.
Finally, we the model can be extended to the case in












Substituting (13) into (4), and using (8):
(9) r (1+1—opV1pEE'—n—ir]
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indicates desired real balances, given by the demand where (H/PY)*
function (11.14
'4Note that this form of adjustment function implicitly assumes that nominal
balances adjust one—for—one with the price level and output, but adjust only
partially in response to difference; between the desired and actual ratios
of real balances to output.
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iT is below the inflation rate ,,
at the low inflation equilibrium. A is a stable
equilibrium and B unstable.In Fig is between the inflation
rates at the high and low equilibri again the low inflation
equilibrium is stable, and the high equilibrium unstable.
Consider now an increase in it. The iow inflation
equilibrium moves from A to A'.On ith real balances the state
variable, the economy moves in each point C.In Figure 2(a)
the inflation rate jumps, and then ises to its new higher
steady state level, with real balan in the process. In
Figure 2(b) the increase in the deficit raises the inflation rate
initially, but it then falls as the economy moves to the new
equilibrium.
Figure 3 shows the
,( ( Thelow inflat
inflation equilibrium stab
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time with the difference t
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Economies earnined in this
rt is not possible, given I > !, for i to e',ceed t.
16Weomit the figure for the case 1< o!and i(> ITs.Itsstability
propertiesare the same as those in Figure 3, but the adjustment path is not
identical.
'"To avoid cluttering the figures we show mainly local dynamics in Figures 2
and 3.The budget constraint becomes vertical at points on the locus (h a
eep—i)l,which in Figure 2 lies to the left of LL and in Figure 3 to
the right of LL,
adjustment pattern when 1 K e!and
ion equilibrium is unstable and the high
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(17) H/P +B—rB—T dY
Here 6 l government purchases, T is taxes, and B is the itoc o{
indexed bonds.We assume that the primary (non—interest) deficit is i
constantproportion, d, D{output.
Denoting by bB/V the ratio of bonds to output, and by
v =V/Vthe ratio of wealth to income, the wealth constraint is's
(18) v b +h
The demand function for real balances is assumed to be:
(19)hv.exp(—(4r))
with the demand function for bonds implied by (18) and (19).
ssuinng exogenous output and no investment, goods market
equilibrium obtains when
(20) V =c(r)V—cT46
where consumption is assumed to be an increasing function of marketable
wealth (VI, a decreasing function of the interest rate (c (r) < 0), and
a decreasing function of taes,2'
We assume that government bonds are regarded as net with, and omit the
analysis of the Ricardian equivalence case.
1The assumption c(r) <0 is consistent with the results that would be
obtained if consumption were explicitly a function of permanent income
which, with income exogenous, is a declining function of the real interest
rite.(21)
17
Goods market equilibrium therefore implies the value of wealth
v (1#c1t—g)/c(r) v(r,g,t)
Here t and g are ratios of upper case letters to
is determined by the requirement of goods market
exogenous level of output: for instance1 because
reduces demand, wealth has to increase to restore equilibrium.ao
specialize (211 by assuming2'
(21) v =(1+c,t—ghr
The government budgetconstraintcan be rewrittena s 27
(17) 8h + b4nb d+ rb
In steady state, b0, (41! + n, and ii The steady state budget
constraint is thus
20The simplilying assumption in (21)
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constant. Ihus steady states lie along the line with slope o —4° on
which (,T+r) isconstant.In Figure 4, there is only one possible
equilibrium with a constant nominal interest rate, at point E. That
result certainly holds for= Q,6 i.e.when wealth is constant, and
-A; in the money—only model, the deficit maybetoo large to be {inaced at
all.lnthis model, in which the demand for money is proportional to wealth,
that policy require; the ratio h/b to be constant,
'With i fixed at i*, the steady state overriment budget coristrrit is
d Ci*exp(—i*)#n—r]vwhich is satisfied at a unique value of r for
constant v. The po;sibility of multiple equilibria ever with fixed i
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Examining local stability conditions, the traceofthe
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When the asset menu i
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Theresults of this piper reinforce the view that avoidance of
unbalanced budgets can play a major role in maintaining macroeconomic
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